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ABBA, FATHER: INCLUSIVE LANGUAGE 
AND THEOLOGICAL SALIENCE! 
H. E. Baber 
Questions about the use of "inclusive language" in Christian discourse are triv-
ial but the discussion which surrounds them raises an exceedingly important 
question, namely that of whether gender is theologically salient-whether 
Christian doctrine either reveals theologically significant differences between 
men and women or prescribes different roles for them. Arguably both conserv-
ative support for sex roles and allegedly progressive doctrines about the theo-
logical significance of gender, race, ethnicity and sexual orientation are con-
trary to the radical teaching of the Gospel that in Christ there is no male or 
female, Greek or Jew, slave or free man. 
The use of "inclusive language" in Christian discourse poses the ques-
tion of whether gender is theologically salient in the sense of either 
revealing theologically significant differences between men and women 
or prescribing different roles for them. 
Donald Hook and Alvin Kimel claim to "demonstrate that the divine 
title '''Father' ... possesses privileged and foundational status within 
Christian discourse" and that alternative nomenclature, specifically the 
use of "Mother," is illegitimate. They argue that this result follows from 
the fact that Jesus authoritatively invoked God as "Abba" or Father 
together with a causal account of reference according to which current 
attempts to invoke or refer to God do so to the extent that they figure on 
a causal chain which originates in Jesus' authoritative act of dubbing. 
Their arguments however presuppose an untenable version of the 
causal theory of reference as well as questionable assumptions about 
Jesus' intention in invoking God as "Abba" which imply that gender is 
theologically salient. Arguably both conservative views about the signif-
icance of gender and allegedly progressive doctrines about the theologi-
cal salience of gender, race, ethnicity and sexual orientation are contrary 
to the radical, countercultural teaching of the Gospel that in Christ there 
is no male or female, Greek or Jew, slave or free man. 
I 
Hook and Kimel argue that "we name God 'Father' because, and only 
because, we are instructed to do by the Second Person of the Holy 
Trinity.'" On their account, Jesus decisively fixes the privileged mode of 
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nomenclature by invoking God as "Father" and this mode of address 
passes down a causal denoting chain maintained by the Church so that 
"if we wish to invoke God or refer to him successfully, we rightly return 
to the ecclesial d-chain. It is the historical community of the Church that 
equips us to name God truly ... for reference to be successful there really 
must be a path leading back to the object."3 
Hook and Kimel claim that their thesis does not presuppose any addi-
tional controversial views about the nature of gender but comes solely 
from the authoritative utterance of Jesus as mediated through Scripture 
and the Tradition of the Church: 
When God is identified as Father, the model of fatherhood is pro-
posed as a paradigm by which deity is to be interpreted. Because 
the mode of presentation is metaphoricat such usage commits one 
to saying that God both is like and is not like a human father in 
specific ways .... By this metaphorical presentation biological sex 
and cultural stereotyping may be excluded from our understand-
ing of deity.' 
Hook and Kimel suggest that Jesus' invocation of God as "Father" is 
revelatory as well as authoritative: "kinship terms of address ... spoken 
within the familial relationship" are especially apt in revealing the 
nature of our relationship to God in Christ.s "Father," they argue, enjoys 
a privileged status that other kinship terms, including "Mother/' do not 
in light of the following considerations: 
(1) "Abba" was Jesus' mode of address for God and our use of 
"Father" to describe and invoke the deity is causally connected 
to Jesus' invocation through an "ecclesial d-chain." 
(2) "Mother" and "Father" are mutuallv exclusive terms: a correct 
ascription of one term to an indiv{dual precludes the correct 
ascription of the other so that they cannot be substituted one 
for the other. "To do so/' they suggest, " is to disrupt gender 
concord and confuse the hearer." 
The fact that, applied to the deity, the use of 'Mother' and 'Father' must 
be metaphorical. .. does not alter this more basic grammatical point: if 
'Father' properly designates the deity, then 'Mother' cannot logically do 
so-and vice versa .... Metaphor does not obliterate the conventional 
meaning of a word." 
Thus, on the account Hook and Kimel suggest, "Abba" names God, 
and the privileged and foundational status which Jesus' invocation con-
fers on "Abba" is transmitted down the ecclesial d-chain to "Father." 
"Mother" cannot be substituted for "Father" since "Mother" and 
"Father" are mutually exclusive. 
The suggested account is reminiscent of mathematical induction: 
Base Step: Jesus established [or revealed] "Abba" as a foundational name 
of God by invoking him as "Abba." 
Induction Step: N is a foundational name of x if N is a referential succes-
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sor of a foundational name. 
It is the account of referential succession Hook and Kimel assume that 
lets "Father" in while excluding "Mother." Their account can be recon-
structed as follows: 
N is a referential successor of N* iff 
(1) the practice of using N to refer to x is causally linked to the use of N* 
and 
(2) Nand N* are logically compatible with regard to any significant 
descriptive content they may possess. 
According to Hook and Kimel, "Father" succeeds Jesus' "Abba" on an 
ecclesial d-chain insofar as the practice of translating rather than translit-
erating "Abba" is established within the Church. "'Father'" they note, 
"confers descriptive content, which is why the word is always translated 
from language to language as the Gospel moves into new cultures.'" 
Translators operating from within the Church conventionally trans-
late" Abba" rather than transliterating it and in so doing signal that they 
regard the descriptive content of the term as significant. "Father is a ref-
erential successor of "Abba" and, therefore, given their account of 
"foundational" names is a foundational name of God. 
"Mother," Hook and Kimel argue, is not a referential successor of 
"Abba" since its descriptive content is logically incompatible with that 
of "Abba." Consequently, "Mother" fails (2) . Its use as a foundational 
name, Hook and Kimel suggest, would require a "new revelation" -pre-
sumably a new act of authoritative tagging comparable to Jesus' invoca-
tion of God as "Abba." 
1I 
It is not clear whether the criterion for referential succession reconstruct-
ed from the account suggested by Hook and Kimel is intended to apply 
to all referring expressions that have descriptive content, to those which 
they identify as titular names, a class which includes "mother," "father" 
and other kinship terms, or only to those uses of titular names that have 
foundational status, in particular, to the use of "Father" to invoke and 
refer to God. (i) If however the intent of Hook and Kimel is to articulate 
an account of reference specific to foundational names then the account 
is ad hoc and they have not established the result which it is supposed to 
support; (ii) if it is intended to be an account of how titular names or 
kinship terms generally function it is plainly false. 
(i) It is disputed whether "father" as used to invoke and refer to God 
possesses a privileged status which disqualifies all antonymous names 
and other expressions from referring to him. If it could be shown that 
there were non-contentious cases of referring expressions which were 
significantly similar to "father" in possessing a similarly privileged sta-
tus and which uncontroversially precluded antonymous expressions 
from referring, that would lend support to the thesis of Hook and Kimel 
that the same was true of the theological use of "father." 
Hook and Kimel however make no attempt to show that there are 
other referring expressions which playa privileged and foundational 
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role within their respective contexts comparable to the role that they 
assert "father" plays within Christian discourse. In fact there do not 
seem to be any: the foundational status they ascribe to the ecclesial use 
of "father" and its cognates appears to be sui generis. Consequently they 
cannot point to the behavior of comparable referring expressions in 
cases which are not contentious in support of their disputed thesis that 
"father," in virtue of its foundational status, behaves as they contend it 
does, in particular, that it precludes the use of antonymous expressions 
as its referential successors. 
Hook and Kimel may indeed stipulate that no referring expression, 
N, which is antonymous to a foundational name, N*, of an object can be 
a referential successor to N*, build this into the criteria for investing a 
name with foundational status and conclude that non-foundational 
names for God shall not be used in liturgical or theological contexts 
because "foundational name" is a term of art which they themselves 
have invented. It has no precedent in Scripture or Tradition so they are 
at liberty to define it as they choose. 
They have not however provided any reason why Christians ought to 
buy into this account other than an interest in supporting the contention 
that "Father" should be used within the Church to invoke and refer to 
God and that "Mother" should not, which is precisely what is in dispute. 
Thus if their proposed conditions for referential succession are meant to 
attach only to "foundational" names they have not made their case. 
(ii) Taken as an account of reference generally, the conditions which 
Hook and Kimel propose for referential succession are implausible. 
They yield highly unintuitive results in a variety of ordinary cases 
where speakers misdescribe the objects to which they refer. Causal theo-
ries of reference attempt to accommodate our intuitions in such cases 
and in the absence of special theological concerns, such as Hook and 
Kimel suggest arise from the "foundational" status of "Father," they 
provide no cause for concern about the possible failure of "Mother" to 
refer to the Being Jesus invoked as "Abba" even if "Mother" is, in some 
respect, misleading. 
A virtue of causal theories of reference vis-a-vis description theories is 
their ability to explain how language users may succeed in referring to 
objects when they are ignorant or positively mistaken about their char-
acter. Thus, in an early article on the causal account of reference, Keith 
Donnellan, cites a variety of cases in which definite descriptions that are 
descriptively inaccurate succeed in referring. Distinguishing between 
the attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions, he notes that 
a speaker uses an expression referentially in order to enable his audience 
to pick out whom or what he is talking about.' As the cases he cites sug-
gest, we may succeed in picking out a person or thing for the purpose of 
asking a question or making an assertion about it by means of a descrip-
tion which is inaccurate. 
Donnellan and other causal theorists have considered circumstances 
in which the descriptive content of referring expressions for language 
users and their communities may deflect or defeat reference. Reference 
however is robust: generally, contriving convincing cases in which refer-
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ence is deflected or defeated requires the construction of elaborate sce-
narios or stories in which speakers make gross errors. 
Perhaps 1 fail to refer in some extreme circumstances ... suppose that 
I think that 1 see at some distance a man walking and ask, 'Is the 
man carrying the walking stick the professor of history?' We 
should perhaps distinguish four cases .... (a) There is a man carry-
ing a walking stick ... (b) The man over there is not carrying a walk-
ing stick but an umbrella .... (c) It is not a man at all but a 
rock ... (d) ... there is nothing at all where I thought there was a man 
with a walking stick .. perhaps a trick of light made me think there 
was a man there. 9 
Donnellan suggests that, intuitively, reference succeeds in all but the last 
case: "failure of reference ... requires circumstances much more radical 
than the mere non-existence of anything fitting the description used. It 
requires that there be nothing of which it can be said, 'That is what he 
was referring to.IIIID 
A causal connection between the use of a name and an act of tagging 
does not always suffice to secure reference. Gareth Evans and others 
have considel:ed circumstances in which the descriptive content of 
names for language users and their linguistic communities may affect or 
defeat reference. I I Nevertheless apart from special theological consider-
ations such as Hook and Kimel suggest, the case of antonymy they cite 
does not appear to be a defeater. 
Mistakes about kinship status and gender are common and do not 
appear to defeat reference. We may successfully refer to babies and 
young children without knowing their gender and to adolescents who 
cultivate a unisex look even when we are mistaken. Under less than 
optimal observational conditions we easily make such mistakes. When I 
see other parents at a distance in their cars picking up their children or 
dropping mine off in the evening I often mistake mothers for fathers and 
vice versa. My children set me straight but none of us seriously doubts 
that I have succeeded in referring to them. 
An advantage of the causal theory of reference over description theo-
ries is precisely their success in delivering the intuitively correct results 
in clear cases like this. Adopting the kind of descriptive criteria Hook 
and Kimel propose, according to which mistakes about parental gender 
make reference at best questionable, undermines an important motiva-
tion for preferring causal accounts of reference to description theories. 
The appeal of Hook and Kimel to the causal theory of reference in 
support of their thesis fails. Without special theologically motivated pro-
visos, the causal theory of reference will not generate the results they 
seek, and the theological motivation for their account, beyond an ad hoc 
interest in blocking the use of "Mother" in theological contexts is, at 
best, obscure. The provision of terminology and technical machinery to 
articulate a controversial thesis does not contribute to showing that the 
thesis is true and Hook and Kimel have provided no compelling reason 
to believe that their account has any independent motivation. 
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III 
Hook and Kimel suggest that there may be independent theological rea-
sons to avoid using "Mother" to invoke and refer to God within the 
Church. Their concern appears to be that "mother" and "father" desig-
nate roles which may be "theologically incompatible." 
Theoretically, the title 'Mother' could be substituted for 'Father,' 
either by tying it into the current Father-chain or by instituting a 
new referential path. The following questions would still have to 
be answered satisfactorily before the Church could authorize either 
option. Do we know that God accepts 'Mother' as a vocatival sub-
stitute for 'Father.'? If it is advanced that God is now inviting 
prayer to him/her as Mother, this claim would appear to require a 
new revelation ... .Is such revelation probable in light of the eschato-
logical finality of 'Father'? ... Considerations regarding content also 
appear at this point. Are the terms synonymous? If they are not (as 
we argue below) then judgment must be made as to their theologi-
cal compatibility. 12 
While they argue at length that "Mother" and "Father" are incompati-
ble in the sense that they cannot accurately describe the same [normal?] 
individual in literal discourse, they do not offer any compelling reason 
why such incompatibility in literal discourse should render expressions 
theologically incompatible when used metaphorically or analogically as 
they grant to be the case for talk about God as FatherY Literal theologi-
cal discourse is indeed constrained by such logical requirements. The 
thesis that God is omnipotent, for example, is theologically as well as 
logically incompatible with claims to the effect that his power is in some 
respects limited. 
Religious discourse which is metaphorical or analogical however 
does not operate within these constraints. Scripture includes a variety of 
metaphorical and analogical expressions which all orthodox Christians 
recognize as proper designations of God that are logically incompatible 
in the sense that they could not be literally true of the same individual. 
In st. John's Gospel, Jesus proclaims himself to be the Good Shepherd, 
the Way, the True Vine, and the Bread that comes down from Heaven, 
designations which cannot be literally true of the same individual. 
Within religious discourse gender also sits lightly. So Thomas Berry 
in a popular religious studies text book, apparently oblivious to concep-
tual difficulties, notes of the transformation of the bodhisattva 
Avalokitesvara within the Buddhist Tradition: 
"This savior personality, originally a masculine figure, was gradually 
changed by the Chinese into a feminine figure ... Eventually 
Avalokitesvara, as Kuan-Yin, became the goddess of mercy of the East-
Asian world."!4 
Both scholars who view the Buddhist Tradition from without and 
religious believers within the Tradition identify Avalokitesvara and 
Kuan-Yin. Although "god" and "goddess" are antonyms neither 
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Buddhists nor scholars of Buddhism seem to have any logical compunc-
tions about describing Kuan-Yin as the Chinese representation of the 
bodhisattva called" Avalokitesvara" in Tibet. Their identity of role 
together with the causal connection between references to them make 
the identification of Avalokitesvara and Kuan-Yin compelling. Similarly, 
early within the Church's history, Christ was identified with the divine 
wisdom, personified as the female figure Sophia and Christians have 
had no logical scruples about invoking him as such: "0 Word of God 
incarnate, 0 Wisdom from on high." 
Hook and Kimel say nothing about the alleged non-biological differ-
ence between fatherhood and motherhood as roles but repeatedly 
invoke the grammatical incompatibility of "mother" and "father" in 
smpport of the thesis that even in metaphorical discourse where the bio-
logical components of gender do not figure they designate distinct prop-
erties which may be theologically incompatible. The grammatical 
antonymy of "mother" and "father" by itself does not however support 
even a prima facie case for the distinctness or incompatibility of the roJes 
they designate. 
Gender distinctions in the designation of social and professional roles 
are dying out in English as a consequence of political correctness and the 
natural tendency of English to lose inflections: "Poetess" is now archaic, 
"actress" may be on the way out, and "directress" survives only within 
altar guild contexts. In these cases however grammatically masculine 
and feminine forms do not mark any difference in role but rather track 
the gender of the roles' occupants. 
By contrast "governor" and "governess" designate entirely different 
roles. A woman who occupies the office of chief state executive is never 
ca lled a "governess." A sign that the governor / governess distinction is 
one of role rather than mere grammatical gender is precisely the willing-
ness of language users who make the distinction to allow that women 
may be governors as well as governesses. Language users who make the 
actor / actress distinction by contrast will not allow for the characteriza-
tion of some women as actors and other as actresses precisely because 
this distinction merely marks the gender of the occupant and indicates 
no difference in role. 
Like actor / actress, and unlike governor / governess, "mother" and 
"father" appear to designate the same role occupied by a woman and a 
man respectively: a mother is a female parent; a father is a male parent." 
Once the biological components of parenthood and "cultural stereotyp-
ing" are factored out it is hard to see what remains of any difference in 
role, and the oddity of suggesting in literal discourse that there could be 
female fathers as well as mothers suggests that, like most gender-
marked designations of social and professional roles, the mother / father 
distinction merely serves to track the gender of the occupant. 
Hook and Kimel suggest that kinship terms are significant in 
Christian discourse insofar as they evoke a role God plays in relation to 
us through Christ. Whether fatherhood and motherhood are different 
roles or not, the grammatical considerations they cite do not by them-
selves make even a prima facie case for holding that motherhood and 
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fatherhood are different roles much less theologically incompatible ones, 
or any reason to think that "father" and "mother" do not do an equally 
good job of designating the parental role which God occupies vis-a-vis 
his creatures. 
IV 
Finally it may be suggested that calling God "Mother" is potentially mis-
leading to the extent that it is a product of linguistic revision in support 
of an agenda. "Mother" as currently used to invoke and refer to God, is 
often embedded in an ideology which some argue is heterodox. 
If the ideological commitments of a linguistic community are too far 
out of whack reference may be deflected or fail. Consider the case of 
"Santa Claus," a corruption of the Dutch name of St. Nicholas, a fourth 
century bishop of Myra. Legends developed about Bishop Nicholas 
shortly after his death-people told stories about him and had false 
beliefs about him. Some Santa Claus lore can be traced back to these sto-
ries and there is a clear causal chain extending from the dubbing of 
Bishop Nicholas to the current use of "Santa Claus." However virtually 
no one wants to say that contemporary Santa Claus lore is really about 
Bishop Nicholas."; 
It is not clear when the St. Nicholas myth got out of hand. 
Nevertheless, unquestionably, at this point Santa Claus lore about the 
elves workshop and the Miracle on 34th Street has so swamped the core 
story about a generous bishop who anonymously gave dowries to poor 
girls, that Santa Claus talk is not about the historical St. Nicholas at all. 
Given the surrounding ideology the causal chain linking "Santa Claus" 
to the Bishop of Myra does not suffice to secure reference. 
Similarly, even if there is a causal chain linking Jesus' invocation of 
God as "Father" to current use of "Mother" to designate the First Person 
of the Trinity, it may be argued that reference is defeated if these terms 
are embedded in an ideology remote from Jesus' intention, the theology 
implicit in Scripture, and the practice of the Church. 
One reason for concern is the alleged incompatibility of feminine lan-
guage and imagery with the traditional understanding of God as "pure 
act." Many advocates of calling God "Mother" are motivated by an inter-
est in affirming God's possession of qualities which they and their oppo-
nents alike regard as characteristically feminine-his receptivity, nurtu-
rance and care. Their opponents worry that this account fails to do justice 
to the alleged centrality of his metaphysical characteristics which it is 
suggested "fit together so as to designate one simple property of having 
necessarily pure, limitless, intentional power." 17 On this account, power, 
allegedly a masculine property, is central to our understanding of the 
divine nature; God's nurturance and care, shown in his transactions with 
us as revealed in Scripture and most particularly through his Incarnation 
as Jesus Christ are .secondary to his metaphysically essential core charac-
teristics as God. Thus Hook and Kimel suggest that "we may speak figu-
ratively of God as an eagle nurturing her young or as a mother bear pro-
tecting her cubs; but we will name him 'father' and not 'mother."'18 
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These considerations are not persuasive. It is a moot point whether 
we ought to conceive of God primarily as a being of pure, limitless, 
intentional power and only secondarily or figuratively as loving and 
nurturing. More importantly for the purpose of this discussion it is also 
controversial whether we should identify power as masculine and nur-
ture as feminine for theological purposes. Scripture and Tradition are 
replete with masculine nurturant images, most notably that of the Good 
Shepherd, and feminine images of power, including the image of the 
Woman Clothed in the Sun crushing the Serpent under her heel. Insofar 
as we deny the assumption that gender is theologically salient, we shall 
reject the identification of power as masculine and nurture as feminine 
and regard gendered talk about God as ideologically innocent. 
Arguably, while the use of gendered language may be innocuous, the 
thesis that gendered nomenclature is theologically significant is not. 
Indeed, insofar as it assumes that gender is theologically salient, it is 
contrary to Scripture and the Church's Tradition. 
The Church is incarnate in a world where distinctions of race, blood 
and gender figure and it accommodates itself to its cultural context-like 
Paul, all things to all men in order to win all to Christ. Still, speculative 
doctrines about the ontological foundations of gender have never been 
central to Christian theology. No such doctrines figure in the historic 
creeds of the Church and to the extent that Christian bodies have sup-
ported sex roles they have done so as part of a more global program of 
enjoining Christians to do the duties prescribed for the state of life in 
which they were called. This affirmation of the existing order mayor 
may not be legitimate. What is significant is that traditionally gender has 
not typically been conceived of as deeper, more "ontologically" signifi-
cant or more theologically loaded than other features of individuals' bio-
logical heritage or social location. 
The thesis that "Father" as distinct from "Mother" possesses a "foun-
dational, privileged status" appears to presuppose that gender is theolog-
ically salient, that there are theologically significant differences between 
males and females and, to the extent that this distinction is taken to be 
normative as well as descriptive, that men and women ought, in at least 
some respects, to play different roles. This is contrary to the radically 
countercultural Christian insight that there are no significant differ-
ences-between male and female, Greek and Jew, slave or free. 
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